

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 217962  
ORIGIN EA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-05 ACDA-12 CIAE-00 INR-10 IO-13  
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 EB-08 NRC-05 OES-09 SOE-02  
DODE-00 DOE-15 SS-15 SP-02 CEQ-01 SAS-02 /120 R

DRAFTED BY EA/TIMBS:TLROBINSON:EVC  
APPROVED BY EA/TIMBS:DPSULLIVAN  
PM/SSP:PPERNYI

-----127155 281731Z /44

P 281636Z AUG 78  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 217962

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PARM, TH, UR

SUBJECT: US-SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER (CAT) TALKS,  
BRIEFING

1. ON AUGUST 18, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE EMBASSY OF THAILAND  
MR. PHINAI WONGSAROT, WAS PROVIDED DEPARTMENTAL BRIEFING ON  
STATUS OF US-SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINT  
TALKS. THE FOLLOWING OUTLINE OF POINTS RAISED IS PROVIDED  
FOR YOUR INFORMATION. BEGIN TEXT.

A. BACKGROUND. THE U.S. AND SOVIETS HAVE MET THREE TIMES  
TO DISCUSS CONVENTIONAL ARMS RESTRAINT. A SUBSTANTIVE  
DIALOGUE REALLY BEGAN ONLY IN MAY, AFTER WHICH THE SIDES  
ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE IN WHICH THEY AGREED (1) THAT THE  
PROBLEM OF LIMITING ARMS TRANSFERS WAS URGENT AND (2) TO  
HOLD REGULARLY SCHEDULED MEETINGS TO EXPLORE CONCRETE  
MEASURES THAT COULD BE TAKEN.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 217962

-- IN MAY THE SSOD ADOPTED A PROGRAM OF ACTION CALLING FOR  
CONSULTATIONS AMONG SUPPLIERS AND RECIPIENTS ON LIMITING  
ARMS TRANSFERS. US-SOVIET BILATERAL MEETINGS REPRESENT AN  
ATTEMPT TO BEGIN TO IMPLEMENT THAT UN MANDATE.

-- EVENTS IN LATIN AMERICA, SUCH AS THE JUNE 22 DECLARATION  
BY THE EIGHT SIGNATORIES OF THE 1974 DECLARATION OF

AYACUCHO CALLING FOR A LATIN AMERICAN AGREEMENT LIMITING CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS OF MEXICO TOWARD THE SAME END, ALSO GIVE IMPETUS TO WORK OF RESTRAINING ARMS TRANSFERS.

## B. OVERALL FRAMEWORK FOR RESTRAINT

THE U.S. OUTLINED A FRAMEWORK OF RESTRAINT TO THE SOVIETS, AS A WAY OF FOCUSING THE DELIBERATIONS. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK CONSISTS OF THREE PARTS.

### 1. POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA

-- THESE CRITERIA WOULD BE BASED ON THE UN CHARTER, UN RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER INTERNATIONALLY AGREED DOCUMENTS.

-- THEY SHOULD SERVE TWO PURPOSES: (1) IDENTIFYING LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON ARMS TRANSFERS; AND (2) IDENTIFYING RELEVANT POLITICAL FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN MAKING ARMS TRANSFER DECISIONS.

-- A GOOD BASIS EXISTS FOR THE ELABORATION OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LANGUAGE.

### 2. MILITARY/TECHNICAL CRITERIA

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 217962

-- COMMONLY AGREED MILITARY/TECHNICAL CRITERIA TO SET BOUNDARIES ON THE TYPES AND AMOUNTS OF WEAPONS TO BE PROVIDED.

-- THESE CRITERIA ARE EQUALLY AS IMPORTANT AS POLITICAL/LEGAL CRITERIA; AND AGREEMENT ON BOTH TYPES OF CRITERIA IS ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO HAVE A COHERENT AND COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR RESTRAINT.

### 3. REGIONAL APPLICATION

-- ARRANGEMENTS TO APPLY CRITERIA IN REGIONAL CONTEXTS.

-- IT IS IMPORTANT TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO CRITERIA THAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE GENERAL AND ABSTRACT STATEMENTS OF INTEREST, SUBJECT TO MANY DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS.

## C. INTERIM RESTRAINT REGIME

-- BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT, IN ADVANCE OF FINAL AGREEMENT ON CRITERIA, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO REACH INTERIM RESTRAINT

ARRANGEMENTS FOR SPECIFIC REGIONS.

-- A BASIS WAS LAID THAT SUCH ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT CONSIST OF LISTS OF WEAPONS TO BE RESTRAINED.

-- BOTH SIDES AGREED IT WAS POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS ANY REGION OR SUB-REGION OF THE WORLD, PROVIDED THEY WERE NOT ARTIFICIALLY CONTRIVED.

D. ROLE OF OTHER SUPPLIERS/RECIPIENTS

-- BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZED THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER SUPPLIERS AND RECIPIENTS IN DEVELOPING AND/OR SUPPORTING ANY RESTRAINT REGIME.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 217962

-- BOTH SIDES WERE HOPEFUL THAT OTHER SUPPLIERS AND RECIPIENTS WOULD FIND IT IN THEIR INTEREST TO SUPPORT ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINT.

-- WE HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS OUR POSITION THAT THE LEGITIMATE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS OF RECIPIENTS MUST BE MET.

E. ASSESSMENT OF ROUND III AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

-- THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE MOVEMENT TOWARD A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF GENERAL GUIDELINES OR CRITERIA FOR RESTRAINT IN ARMS TRANSFERS.

-- THE SOVIETS AGAIN APPEARED TO TAKE THESE DISCUSSIONS SERIOUSLY. HOWEVER, THE NEXT ROUND -- TENTATIVELY PLANNED FOR DECEMBER TO ENABLE BOTH SIDES TO UNDERTAKE THOROUGH PREPARATIONS -- WILL PROVIDE A TEST OF THE PROSPECTS FOR NEAR-TERM SUCCESS OF CAT. END TEXT.

2. POINT WAS MADE THAT EMPHASIS OF US-SOVIET TALKS WAS TO GET SOVIETS TO RESTRAIN POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS AS THE U.S. HAD ALREADY DONE UNILATERALLY. OUR FRIENDS NEED NOT BE CONCERNED THAT TALKS SINGALED LACK OF RESOLVE ON OUR PART TO CONTINUE TO HELP OUR FRIENDS WITH LEGITIMATE SELF DEFENSE NEEDS. THE SOVIET ARMS BUILD-UP IN SOME PARTS OF AFRICA WAS EXAMPLE OF KIND OF ESCALATION OF WEAPONRY LEADING TO DESTABILIZING SITUATION THAT THE TALKS AIMED TO AVOID IN THE FUTURE. PHINAI ASKED IF WE DIDN'T THINK SOVIETS WOULD BE INCLINED TO DRAG OUT THE TALKS UNTIL THEIR OBJECTIVES WERE MET. WE SAID IT WAS OUR FEELING THAT SOVIETS WERE APPROACHING TALKS SERIOUSLY. SOVIETS KNEW WE EXPECTED RESULTS FROM  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 217962

TALKS AND DID NOT SEE THEM AS OPEN ENDED. SOVIETS ALSO

KNEW WE COULD NOT PROLONG UNILATERAL RESTRAINT INDEFINITELY WITHOUT COOPERATION OF OTHERS. PHINAI ASKED WHAT WAS THE LIKELIHOOD OF OTHER ALLIED SUPPLIER NATIONS FROM EITHER SIDE JOINING U.S. AND SOVIETS IN ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINTS. WE SAID FIRST OBJECTIVE WAS TO GET UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. AND SOVIETS (TWO LARGEST SUPPLIERS) ON ISSUE, THEN WE EXPECT OTHERS TO FOLLOW OUR LEAD. PHINAI NOTED THAT PRINCIPLE SUPPLIERS TO SEA, AND PARTICULARLY THAILAND INSURGENTS, WERE CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND CHINA AND ASKED ABOUT THEIR PARTICIPATION. WE NOTED THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA WOULD PRESUMABLY COME UNDER ANY ARRANGEMENT MADE WITH THE SOVIETS, BUT THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY IN THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS TO SPECULATE ABOUT CHINA.

3. PHINAI ASKED US FOR BACKGROUND PAPERS ON THE SUBJECT THAT HE WOULD USE FOR BASIS OF REPORT TO HIS GOVERNMENT. WE GAVE HIM TEXT OF STATEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER POLICY ISSUED BY PRESIDENT CARTER ON MAY 19, 1977. CHRISTOPHER

SECRET

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** NEGOTIATIONS, ARMS TRANSPORT RESTRICTIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 28 aug 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978STATE217962  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** TLROBINSON:EVC  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780351-0320  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780817/aaaaantk.tel  
**Line Count:** 195  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 7625635a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ORIGIN EA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 19 may 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 1600320  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** US-SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER (CAT) TALKS, BRIEFING  
**TAGS:** PARM, PCAT, TH, UR  
**To:** BANGKOK  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/7625635a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014